FLYING LESSONS for May 7, 2026

THIS WEEK: >> Little tolerance for low >> You can always go around >> Where are YOU looking?

FLYING LESSONS uses recent mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances.  In most cases design characteristics of a specific airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents—but knowing how your airplane’s systems respond can make the difference in your success as the scenario unfolds. So apply these FLYING LESSONS to the specific airplane you fly.  Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and recommendations taking precedence.  You are pilot in command and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.     

FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC.

This week’s LESSONS

If you’ve not seen or heard about it yet—and I don’t know how you could have missed it—there’s been widespread online video and comment about a transatlantic United Airlines 767 that descended below glidepath and collided with a light pole and a bakery truck on the Jersey Turnpike during landing at Newark Liberty Airport (KEWR), Newark, New Jersey, just across the river from New York City.

I found this somewhat potent description online

The procedure itself notes, with my emphasis added:

And also:

A Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) is a series of lights that define a visual glide path. From the FAA:

When on the visual glidepath two red and two white lights are visible because of the airplane’s location and the angle at which the lights project from the box. A little high and three white lights and one red light appear—increase vertical speed slightly with power and/or pitch to require the two red/two white indication. 

Higher than that on glidepath and all four lights appear white. Increase angle of descent—reduce power and/or lower pitch—to reacquire the desired two red/two white state if you’re able to do so in a smooth, gradual and controlled manner before reaching the runway threshold. If not, go around.

Slightly below glidepath and three red lights appear along with one white. Add power and/or use any excess airspeed energy to reduce angle of descent until back on the proper two red/two white glidepath. If you can’t get there prior to the threshold, go around

See four red lights? Positively arrest rate and angle of descent with power while managing airspeed to re-establish at least the three red/one white condition right away, then trend to the desired two red/two white state before reaching the runway threshold. If there is an immediate obstacle or terrain hazard when you see the four-red indication go around without hesitation. If you do not almost immediately see the three red/one white display when you begin your correction go around without delay

When flying the visual glide path the aircraft will be approximately 50 feet above the runway threshold as you cross it (About one and a half Cessna 172 wingspans), and descending at an angle that results in touching down approximately 1000 feet past the threshold. There’s little tolerance for being low.

U.S. regulations require, when operating in Class D airspace (such as KEWR):

That glide path may be electronic or visual—such as the PAPI.

Runway 29 is short by international Boeing standards, 6725 feet. But reportedly strong winds made it the favored runway for this 767 inbound from Venice, Italy with over 200 passengers. That may have made the crew want to eschew the usual touchdown zone markers 1000 feet from the runway threshold—which effectively makes this a 5725 foot-long runway—and instead “aim for the numbers” or some other point closer to the runway threshold. 

The runway is 150 feet wide which, combined with a comparatively short length, introduces the visual illusion that the airplane is higher on approach than it actually is. Did the crew brief on this illusion, or the Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring take it into account?

A strong headwind on final reduces ground speed. Consequently, for a given airspeed the aircraft will descend at a steeper angle than it would with less headwind. Did the crew take this into account, or did the Pilot Flying add power to result in the standard 3° visual glidepath?

Did the crew note the “low” (three or eventually four red lights) PAPI indication? If so, why did it not act? Did they use the PAPI, positioned on the nonstandard side of the runway, or even know the PAPI exists?

Will investigation reveal that the crew did see the low-glidepath state and act, not in time to miss the light pole and the truck, but soon enough to prevent a far worse outcome had the big 767 descended just a few feet lower?

Was pilot fatigue part of the equation, after a long oceanic flight?

The obvious LESSON is to maintain a safe glide path on final approach that provides obstacle clearance to the runway touchdown zone markers, themselves placed 1000 feet from the runway threshold (or if the runway is less than 3000 feet long, 1/3 the total runway length) specifically to provide tolerance for landing a little short. That’s easy to say, and easy for us to dismiss—I’d never do that.

The more nuanced message is for all pilots to consider: 

  • The many factors that can cause illusions on final approach;
  • The glide angle impact of landing into a strong headwind;
  • The effects of fatigue even over the length of a typical general aviation flight, including the insidious effect of flight even only a few thousand feet up in unpressurized aircraft, especially when personal flights are often tacked on to other duties and activities of a busy day.
  • The availability of visual glide path indicators at most airports, even those not in Class D airspace, and the wisdom of following visual approach path guidance whenever it is available.
  • Notes and cautions on instrument approach charts and in the Chart Supplement (or your country’s equivalent) that may warn of nonstandard visual glide paths, visual guidance that does not align with electronic vertical guidance but which takes precedence over the electronic glidepath once transitioned to a visual approach, or other obstacle information. 

Adjust all of the above if the runway has no visual glide path, it has nonstandard markings or no markings at all, or if some operational reason makes you decide to touch down at some point other than the standard touchdown zone, especially if close to the runway threshold.

Whether rolling out on final from a visual or circling instrument procedure, making a straight-in from an instrument approach, or entering final from any number of approved traffic pattern entries (see last week’s FLYING LESSONS Weekly): 

  1. Know if there’s visual approach path guidance; 
  2. If so, know the type of indicator (PAPI, VASI, etc.) and how to use it, and 
  3. Know where to look (left or right of the runway, or both) to find it.

You can always go around—and you must, if you are too low on glidepath too close to the runway.   

Questions? Comments? Supportable opinions? Let us know at [email protected]

Debrief

Readers write about recent LESSONS

Several readers wrote about last week’s discussion of traffic pattern entries, and the pilots who sometimes don’t follow them. First up is well-known instructor and airshow pilot Doug Rozendaal:

Air carrier aircraft operating at nontowered airfields, especially at night, is a “whole other” issue. I may address it someday, but the target audience is more Professional Pilot and Air Line Pilot and certainly not reading FLYING LESSONS Weekly.  For those of us here last week’s LESSON applies: fly correctly so others can find you and predict where you’ll go nextbut expect the other pilot will not fly correctly or predictably and watch out accordingly. And instructors, teach this to your students early in their training—maybe some of it will guide their decisions when they are flying the Regional Jet. Thanks as always, Doug.

Instructor and Airline Transport Pilot Sam Dawson adds:

Good reminder, Sam. 14 CFR 91.103 tells us:

So “not on the Jepp charts” is not an excuse, but it is an explanation. It’s right there in the Chart Supplement for KDNA whether the crew carried VFR Sectionals or not. Again, we must fly defensively, but you did a great job educating the professional pilots and respectfully reminding them their preflight responsibility goes beyond what’s on instrument approach charts in a way that made a real difference. Thank you.

Reader Randy Starbuck wraps up this week’s Debrief with one of my pet peeves and instructional talking points:

Many years ago AOPA’s Air Safety Foundation (predecessor to the AOPA Air Safety Institute) published research showing that most midair collisions occur in the traffic pattern below 400 feet AGL on final approach, and that usually one of the airplanes involved is an instrument instructional flight flying an approach while the other is flying a VFR traffic pattern, often with a low-time pilot. The (usually) faster IFR airplane catches up with an collides with the (usually slower) VFR airplane. 

Whether or not those statistics are still valid, I’ve used this as a major part of what I teach about collision avoidance to both visual and instrument students. For instrument students and in Instrument Proficiency Checks (IPCs) I stress making traffic calls in terms of location, distance from the airport, and intentions, as you describe: “five miles north, straight in runway 18” when at Deyek, which is the final approach fix. For visual patterns, including on Flight Reviews, I stress looking for airplanes everywhere. On downwind I’m looking for long straight-ins and airplanes on the opposite side of the airport. Turning base I visually clear and say aloud, “final approach is clear, backwards base is clear, the runway is clear, I’m clear to land.” That’s also a double-check that I am in fact cleared to land at a tower-controlled airport. On final I look for aircraft and vehicles on the runway or where they may soon move on to the runway.

An extra for instrument instructors: When you’re flying an approach with your student “under the hood,” where is that student looking? At the instruments, of course (no fair peeking). But instructor, where are you looking? Usually the “double I” (instrument instructor) is also watching the instruments, and watching the student watch the instruments. Where your attention needs to be focused is outside the aircraft, watching for others on downwind, turning base, the “wrong-side, backward” version of each, and—hardest to see, because there’s little relative movement—on final approach ahead of you, waiting for you to catch up. 

Thank you, Randy.

More to say? Let us learn from you, at [email protected].

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FLYING LESSONS is ©2026 Mastery Flight Training, Inc.  For more information see www.thomaspturner.com. For reprint permission or other questions contact [email protected].  

Disclaimer

FLYING LESSONS uses recent mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In most cases design characteristics of a specific airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents—but knowing how your airplane’s systems respond can make the difference in your success as the scenario unfolds. Apply these FLYING LESSONS to the specific airplane you fly.

Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.