A big part of flying safety is workload management. You may have already noticed I’m a day late with FLYING LESSONS this week. With that in mind—and more importantly, because of great reader insights—let’s go directly to this week’s Debrief.
“A superior pilot uses his superior judgment to avoid situations which require the use of his superior skill.” – Apollo 8 astronaut Frank Borman, who passed away this week
Questions? Comments? Supportable opinions? Let us know at [email protected].
Debrief:
Readers write about recent FLYING LESSONS:
Reader/instructor Alan David writes:
I was one of the many that were shocked to hear about Richard McSpadden. The day the crash happened I went right to my cell phone, looked up Lake Placid [New York], and started studying the area. Granted, I don’t know which way they took off or what altitude they got to, but I have this horrible feeling that they fell into the back to the airport trap. There is quite a bit of open land in either direction off of either end of the runway. Yikes, am I imaging things or did the trap get them?
I think I mentioned in an earlier edition how hearing of Richard’s death hit me hard for about four days thinking the same thing—if someone of his caliber could die in an accident matching the initial reports, then who am I to think I can make a difference? Am I fooling myself that I’m doing any good teaching about improving safety as pilot-in-command? Eventually I resolved that there are LESSONS to learn from virtually every flight, including (and perhaps especially) in this case.
Still-preliminary information now suggests this was not a total power loss immediately after takeoff, but that it may have been a more insidious partial loss of engine power a bit further away from the airport, as the Cardinal was “joining up” into formation flight with the A36 Bonanza camera airplane. Still, there are many valuable LESSONS suggested by the facts of this tragedy as they are known at this point.
Scott “Gunny” Perdue this week posted about the NTSB preliminary report on this accident on his Flywire YouTube channel. For those of us who knew Richard personally (or Cardinal owner Russ Francis, who also died in the crash) it’s especially difficult to talk about this event. Gunny applied the same respectful treatment of the facts as they are known to this point as Richard did in his extremely professional Early Analysis reports on AOPA’s website. I agree with Gunny’s comments given what we know so far. Had Richard recorded an Early Analysis video on the facts of this preliminary report the content would likely have covered similar ground.
The NTSB’s final report (in a year or so) should answer more questions about the specifics of this crash. But chances are it will not teach us many more LESSONS we can’t already glean now. I’ve touched on possible considerations many times in past LESSONS and elsewhere, including:
- In an off-airport landing, the greatest chance of survival comes when you touch down WUSS: wings level, under control at the slowest safe speed.
- The “turnback maneuver” after engine failure shortly after takeoff, even if recently practiced by a highest capable pilot, presents a far lower chance of survival than landing WUSS straight ahead even into obstacles.
- The lack of good options roughly straight ahead does not by itself suddenly make attempting to turn back a good idea.
- According to Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) research I’ve cited in FLYING LESSONS many times, partial power loss is three times as likely to have resulted in an accident report than total power loss historically…and the less glaringly obvious indications of partial power loss as compared to total engine failure introduces confusion that will negatively impact the pilot’s response.
- If an engine anomaly occurs before takeoff, investigate it thoroughly, and don’t try to take off again until the reason is determined and corrected.
- As discussed in my October 26 LESSONS, set takeoff targets for every departure, then monitor actual performance against these targets. If the aircraft fails to attain a target, abort.
- In a retractable gear airplane, the default response to a power-off or off-airport landing should be a gear up landing. In most RG airplanes at their Best Glide speed extending landing gear adds about 500 feet per minute to the gear-up rate of descent. As I’ve noted many times over the years, it’s common when an engine failure occurs in an RG airplane that the airplane either stalls or descends into obstacles a quarter mile or less from the pilot’s apparent intended landing spot. The landing gear is usually down when this occurs. I suspect in such cases the pilot has set up a glide that is going to work, then decides to extend the wheels. As soon as the gear leaves the wheel wheels and drag increases, what might have been a successful WUSS touchdown will no longer work. Leave the gear up unless you are high and very close to touchdown. Sliding it on under control is a very acceptable outcome.
- If it can happen to someone like Richard McSpadden, it can happen to anyone. We all need to exercise superior judgment on every flight, looking for signs of trouble and acting before we find ourselves needing superior skill.
I’m confident from my frequent talks with Richard McSpadden, and his many articles and videos I’ve read and watched, that he would have wanted us all to learn these LESSONS and act on them in all our flying. It’s incredibly tragic that it took the Lake Placid crash to remind us, yet again, that the circumstances of most aircraft accidents are repetitive and predictable.
In last week’s Debrief I replied to a comment from reader Damon Overboe, who wrote about “my” 50/70 Rule as a takeoff target. I’d written:
…it’s the 50/70 rule, not my 50/70 rule. Thank you, Damon.
This week Damon continues:
Well, it might be the rule, but a lot of people get it wrong or use something else! Like 70% of your speed by 50% of an 8000 foot runway in a single in the flatlands means you should have pulled the power and aborted five minutes ago!
Bold Method, which I typically like [for] their articles (but not always) is one that keeps repeating it incorrectly. And it is definitely not just them. I heard it in flying schools, all around the circuit. It’s so ridiculous! Sorry for incorrectly crediting you with it, but I haven’t heard others explain it properly or like you do so I thought it was yours.
I agree, many (otherwise) outstanding instructors and resources seem to get the 50/70 rule wrong. For example, Bold Method’s entry says:
The 50/70 rule is a general rule for GA aircraft that says if you haven’t reached 70% of your takeoff speed by the time you’ve reached 50% of the length of the runway, you should abort your takeoff.
The common error is stating that the rule compares airspeed to runway length. In reality, the rule compares airspeed to computed takeoff distance. You should be at 70% of your liftoff speed by the time you are 50% of the way to your liftoff point. If not, abort. The comparison is an indirect measure of power development (and tire pressure, runway condition and contamination and other environmental factors) that might rob the airplane of takeoff performance and be detectable by less-than-expected takeoff ground roll distance.
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From www.aopa.org:
Rebranded Report Highlights Improved Accident Rate
AOPA this week has released its 33rd Air Safety Institute Accident Report. The 33rd AOPA Air Safety Institute Accident Report (until now honoring the legacy of Joseph T. Nall) has been renamed in honor and memory of Richard McSpadden. Richard’s work focused on reaching audiences with relevant, timely, and engaging content. His tireless efforts to improve aviation safety helped envision the current iteration of this report, which offers users a near real-time analysis of general aviation accidents. The data are updated on a rolling 30-day cycle, with access to analysis going back as far as 2008 and data trends projected well into 2023.
Executive summaries in the report note a decrease in overall accident rates despite an increase in the actual number of total and fatal accidents mitigated by a large increase in flight activity following 2020. AOPA notes that accident rates in non-commercial fixed-wing, commercial fixed-wing, and commercial helicopters all fell, while non-commercial helicopter rates rose. Stall/loss-of-control events continue to be the leading causal factor and weather-related accidents remain highly lethal. These accident causes—related to pilot decision-making and proficiency—help inform the industry, including the AOPA Air Safety Institute, where further education and training are needed to improve aviation safety.
Read the Richard G. McSpadden Report here. I’ll be looking into the report and its conclusions and may have my own commentary in future editions of FLYING LESSONS Weekly.
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