FLYING LESSONS for May 29, 2025

Topics this week include: > Early Analysis > Approach category > The spirit of the rule

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FLYING LESSONS uses recent mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances.  In most cases design characteristics of a specific airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents—but knowing how your airplane’s systems respond can make the difference in your success as the scenario unfolds. So apply these FLYING LESSONS to the specific airplane you fly.  Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and recommendations taking precedence.  You are pilot in command and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.     

FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC.

This week’s LESSONS:

The crash of a privately operated, single-pilot Cessna Citation II jet into a military housing area in the wee hours of the morning of May 22 received significant press both in aviation and mainstream markets. Six aboard the jet died in the crash and there was extensive damage to houses and cars in the airplane’s final, explosive path. 

Several subject matter experts have posted their views on the crash with what’s known so far. Best among them (in my opinion) is the Early Analysis done by AOPA Air Safety Institute’s Mike Ginter. I think it’s best because Mike dispassionately lays out the facts and some general considerations suggested by initial reports—the same sort of thing I try to do in FLYING LESSONS Weekly. If you’ve not yet seen a preliminary review of this crash and you’re interested, or if you’ve watched analyses that are strong on causation and judgement, watch the 10 minute ASI program.

The flight appeared to be very precisely following the approach—“stabilized” and “on rails,” as Ginter puts it—up to the Final Approach Fix. The FAF is where glidepath intercept occurs and the final descent begins. In this case the FAF is 6.3 miles from the runway threshold and the airplane was, and should be, at 2500 feet above Mean Sea Level, or 2077 feet above the runway touchdown zone elevation. That’s a bit higher than a typical glidepath/glideslope intercept, but also over a mile further away than typical, resulting in the standard three-degree descent gradient. 

As Ginter notes, the Citation appears to have been very precise, up to the FAF. But by the next fix on the approach, PALOS, the jet was about 180 feet below glidepath. It continued to descend below glidepath until impacting power lines about 50 feet below their charted height of 554 feet MSL. The vertical speed (not specifically mentioned) was greater than required to maintain glidepath at the aircraft’s current ground speed.

The was a lot working against the safe completion of this flight. It had flown overnight more than seven hours across the entire country with a quick, middle-of-the-night fuel stop at my home airport at Wichita, Kansas. The pilot may have been working all day up to the late evening departure from Teterboro, New Jersey, according to online comments. The weather reporting system at the destination airport was inoperative and nearby airports reported conditions below minimums for the approach being flown. A NOTAM reported inoperative instrument approach lights.

I really can’t add to ASI’s Early Analysis except for one additional item not reported there or anywhere else I’ve seen for that matter: Approach category. Online sources state the Citation II is a Category C airplane. Some pilots report it may be flown Category B. Ginter’s analysis states the airplane was flying “120 to 125 knots, a little fast.” That would put the jet in Category C for the approach as flown. The RNAV (GPS) 28R approach chart includes that minimums are “NA”—Not Authorized—for Category C and D airplanes. 

That leads us to this week’s LESSON: a review of the sometimes-misunderstood Approach Category requirements.

In 2023 the FAA published Information for Operators  (InFO) letter 23001, Use of Aircraft Approach Category During Instrument Approach Operations. This letter replaces some previous guidance and clarifies regulatory and other advisory guidance to reinforce the rules of approach categories. The InFO states:

See the InFO for full details.

 

The language of the InFO does not make using a higher category mandatory, using terms like “should” instead of “must” be used, and including the qualifier “if available.” It’s “the pilot’s responsibility,” as the InFO states, to determine which minima apply. Although the “letter” of the law is that the higher category is recommended but not required, I feel the spirit of the rule implores pilots to use the approach category for the speed at which they are flying. In the case of the accident Citation jet that would imply the approach is not authorized, and should not be flown, at faster than 120 knots…the top of Category B. 

That’s yet one more red flag in addition to those pointed out in ASI’s Early Analysis that should cause a pilot to rethink flying that approach under those conditions…or attempting that back-of-the-clock literal cross-country flight under those circumstances at all. Would this have made any difference in the Citation crash? Other than convincing the pilot he should not have attempted the approach at all, probably not. The answer probably resides in why the aircraft descended more steeply than the published glidepath until it hit the overhead lines and plunged into the houses below. It takes time for the investigators do their work.

Regardless this tragedy is a good reminder to consider the regulation—and the safety intent—of approach category, and how it is one factor on deciding whether and how to fly an approach.  

Questions? Comments? Supportable opinions? Let us know at [email protected]

Debrief 

Readers write about recent LESSONS:

Several readers added to last week’s discussion of techniques for avoiding minor but costly accidents. Jim Piper writes:

 Jason Robertson adds:

Richard McGinnis agrees:

As does Mark Travis:

John Dale suggests a solution to tow bar strikes:

Some readers sent in hangar scenarios, including this from Chuck Davis:

Fred Rogge adds: 

From Laurie McGavran:

Thank you, everyone, for your added techniques, experiences and discussion.

More to say? Let us learn from you, at [email protected]

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Disclaimer

FLYING LESSONS uses recent mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In most cases design characteristics of a specific airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents—but knowing how your airplane’s systems respond can make the difference in your success as the scenario unfolds. Apply these FLYING LESSONS to the specific airplane you fly.

Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.