FLYING LESSONS for May 2, 2024

FLYING LESSONS uses recent mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances.  In most cases design characteristics of a specific airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents—but knowing how your airplane’s systems respond can make the difference in your success as the scenario unfolds. So apply these FLYING LESSONS to the specific airplane you fly.  Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and recommendations taking precedence.  You are pilot in command and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.     

FLYING LESSONS is an independent product of MASTERY FLIGHT TRAINING, INC.

This week’s LESSONS:

Questions? Comments? Supportable opinions? Let us know at [email protected]

Debrief: 

Readers write about recent FLYING LESSONS:

Reader and retired TWA captain Tom Rosen writes:

Great insights. As we’ve discussed many times before you and I are in agreement on may topics, especially fuel strategies to avoid fuel starvation or exhaustion. Job duties prevented me from departing a day early as you suggest, so I had to deal with the conditions that morning. Thank you, Tom.

A frequent Debriefer who nonetheless asks to remain anonymous writes:

I’ve had almost nothing by thoughtful and positive comments. One person called me out on FaceBook, saying others had flown across the route (but not saying when—had I been 10 minutes earlier the gap may still have been wide enough for me to get through like I have so many times before). Anonymous continues:

That’s my experience also, Anonymous—diversions and delays are in the nature of summer flying. Winter, spring and autumn, too. Thank you.

Reader Dan Drew adds:

Thank you, Dan.

Reader Art Utay continues:

I’ve frequently flown as close to a line of storms as safely possible (which includes time to land, taxi in, and get the airplane into a hangar if possible or tie it down if not), then sat it out on the ground. Sometimes that requires an overnight stay, especially if I’m well into my personal 12-hour duty day (alarm clock to engine shutdown) when the encounter occurs. I would not have launched last week either if all indications, including three-minute old radar and a couple of Pilot Reports, did not report the wide gap in the storms was still there when I took off. I flew until I found I could not maintain visual separation from the cells as I got closer to the line, and ATC told me I had “extreme” precipitation for over 100 miles along my route of flight—a situation not included in the forecasts or radar and observations just before I began my flight.

It’s ironic at how nice the weather can be a short while after a line of heavy thunderstorms. Thank you, Art.

Instructor and past corporate jet pilot (and my recent simulator instructor) Charles Lloyd adds:

I wouldn’t have taken off into an 800-foot ceiling knowing the autopilot was inoperative either, but it passed the preflight test on the ground. Even in this era of lightning detection and weather data uplinks, visual contact (“eyeballs”) is my primary storm avoidance tool. As I said before, I turned around when I learned I would not be able to visually avoid storm cells. Thank you, Charles.

Reader Dennis O’Donnell writes:

I think you nailed a key point. restated thus: Plan your flight and fly your planbut part of your planning is to identify options, and part of flying your plan is to exercise them without hesitation when needed. Thank you, Dennis.

Retired Air Force and airline pilot John Scherer relates his experience:

Reader and well-known flight instructor Mark Boguski continues:

Some of my nicest flying destinations have been weather diversions; some of my nicest flights were the morning after a line of heavy storms had passed. Thank you, Mark.

Reader William Eilberg asks the question I’ve been asking myself:

Thanks for pushing me out of my echo chamber, William.

I ask myself these questions in my standard self-debrief after every flight: 

  • What went right? 
  • What went wrong? 
  • What would I do differently next time? 
  • What did I learn from this flight?

As I stood in the hangar waiting for the extreme-level rain to slacken, first I listed why I started the challenging trip in the first place:

  1. Weather products observations and forecasts, and my knowledge of thunderstorm development and movement, all confirmed there appeared to be a window of opportunity to fly through what was before takeoff a 100-mile wide gap in the storms.
  2. Pilot reports supported that I would be well above the clouds at my planned 9000 foot cruising altitude, permitting me to visually see and avoid cumulonimbus clouds by no less than 20 miles, deviating as necessary around buildups.
  3. Conditions between my point of departure and the line of storms were storm-free, giving me options to divert before reaching the line if needed.
  4. I’m instrument current and use simulator and in-flight hand-flying regularly to maintain a high level of proficiency.
  5. I have multiple sources of weather data in the cockpit for strategic weather planning before “going tactical” around clouds by visual avoidance.
  6. The airplane is well equipped, well maintained, and a type with which I am highly familiar and experienced.
  7. I felt an obligation to the organizer of the fly-in to deliver my presentation the next morning, and to my employer to “show the flag” at the event, by making every effort safely possible to complete the trip in time.

I’m very aware that the list above is a hazardous pilot attitudes trap. If I have an accident someone is going to point to this list online and say I was “macho” or “anti-authority” or “resigned” or “impulsive,” or felt I was “invulnerable,” and that my own list proves it. To an extent pilots need a bit of each of these attitudes to be able to confidently and safely command and control an aircraft. The trick is to constantly find objective ways to confirm they are all positives, and not become complacent or rationalize my/your proficiency and the airplane’s airworthiness.

What went right? I flew well. Except for the autopilot the airplane performed well. My plan, to shoot for the gap but divert well before entering storms, worked. I took off thinking (and even telling three people at three different times before departing) I would land short of the line at Topeka, Kansas if the gap in the line closed, and wait it out there. I made the decision to divert almost immediately when I found I could not maintain visual separation when approaching the line. When I decided to divert conditions were deteriorating to the point it looked like there would be no option to get through all day (which proved to be correct)—I didn’t feel locked into my back-up plan but returned home, still a safe option. Flying the approach into my home airport I knew flying east about 30 miles to a nearby airport with better weather and approaches I regularly fly with students was my “out” should I miss the approach with storms approaching from the west.

What went wrong? The autopilot (actually the electric trim) failed. Forecasts and even very recent pilot reports aside, I was not on top of clouds at 9000 or even 11,000 feet. The gap in the line of storms filled in rapidly. Unforecast thunderstorm cells formed west of my home airport when I decided to return. The ceiling at my home airport was much lower than forecast when I returned.

What would I do differently next time? I would have rearranged or canceled meetings the day before and taken work with me to do at destination and make the flight a day earlier (the fly-in organizer even offered to pay an extra night for me to do so, but too late in the day for me to make arrangements). Alternately I would have booked airline tickets, although the organizer—and my employer—wanted me to display the company airplane at the event. I would have diverted back to the home airport as soon as the autopilot malfunctioned. I might have called no-go before taking off, anticipating the gap in the line of storms might not hold even with my solid-gold “out.”

What did I learn from this flight? I had the discipline to make the inflight “no-go” decision immediately when I found my primary avoidance tool—visual avoidance—was not available. Temptation is great, at least it is for me. The accident record suggests virtually all weather mishaps involve a pilot going somewhere he/she should know not to go but trying it anyway. I’m no less susceptible but I had it in me to “just say no” when the situation required…which was well before entering the threat area, not only after I found myself in trouble.

Airline and charter operators are not permitted to begin an instrument approach unless the airport has official weather reporting and the reported conditions are at or above approach minimums at the time the approach begins. Private, noncommercial operators have the authority to fly an approach without weather reporting or when conditions are below minimums; it’s arguably no less safe provided the pilot flies the procedure precisely as charted, including beginning the missed approach immediately and correctly at or before the Missed Approach Point if landing criteria are not met. Fly down, don’t see the ground, fly back up again.  

My strategy aiming for the gap in the line of storms was like a horizontal approach procedure: like an instrument approach, safe as long as I flew it as I “charted.” Approach the line at an altitude where I can visually deviate around cells while maintaining no less than 20 miles separation from each. Turn around if I am not able to visually avoid cumulonimbus clouds by at least that much, and do it right away, well before I’m 20 miles from the storms if it’s obvious I won’t be able to maintain visual separation. The key is to plan the flight and fly the plan, including alternatives. No eyes, no storm-filled skies.

After I had the airplane bedded down in its hangar and while I waited for the rain to slacken enough I could get to my car without being completely soaked, I posted a screen shot of my flight track and a short description of my flight on FaceBook. My sister in Ohio replied, “I’m glad you’re safe.” Without really thinking about the gravity of my response I replied, “I was always safe. I decided to keep it that way.” 

I plan to live up to that response on every flight. I hope you do, too.

More to say? Let us learn from you, at [email protected]

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Thank you to our regular monthly financial contributors:

And thanks to these donors in 2024:


Thomas P. Turner, M.S. Aviation Safety 

2015 Flight Instructor Hall of Fame Inductee

2021 Jack Eggspuehler Service Award winner

2010 National FAA Safety Team Representative of the Year 

2008 FAA Central Region CFI of the Year

Disclaimer

FLYING LESSONS uses recent mishap reports to consider what might have contributed to accidents, so you can make better decisions if you face similar circumstances. In most cases design characteristics of a specific airplane have little direct bearing on the possible causes of aircraft accidents—but knowing how your airplane’s systems respond can make the difference in your success as the scenario unfolds. Apply these FLYING LESSONS to the specific airplane you fly.

Verify all technical information before applying it to your aircraft or operation, with manufacturers’ data and recommendations taking precedence. You are pilot in command, and are ultimately responsible for the decisions you make.